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Out of weakness: the Ôeducational goodÕ in late antiquity 
Ansgar Allen [Forthcoming in Pedagogy, Culture & Society] 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper explores the nature of the educational good as it appears in late 
antiquity, arguing that the ÔgoodÕ variously promised by education is in a state of perpetual 
deferral. This extends the tradition of ancient Greek philosophy where wisdom is to be 
forever approached but never realised. Three exemplary cases are considered: the 
educational good as it appears under the auspices of the Roman tutor; as it is manifested 
in Christian baptismal practices; and as it is practiced in early Christian monasticism. To 
lure willing subjects into an educational relationship whose fruits will ultimately never be 
realised, the educator must respectively employ techniques of seduction, suspicion and 
diversion. 
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The educational consequences of late antiquity, that period from the second to the eighth 
centuries, remain neglected. It is common for educators to trace their ancestry a little 
further, recalling the philosophers of ancient Greece in a way that jumps many 
intervening centuries [1]. In focusing on the period following the decline of the Greek 
philosophical schools, I trace their more immediate educational legacies as they were 
adapted to the needs of a wider society. 
In constructing this account I investigate the provenance of a belief so current in 
our present, that beneath all corruptions education is a self-evident good requiring only 
further refinement. It appears this conviction will not be abandoned however much 
education is debased in practice, however much it is reduced to the status of a 
measurable commodity, to a utilitarian device for Ôgetting aheadÕ. Indeed, the 
performative busywork which so characterises education today could be interpreted as a 
desperate attempt to redeem a fallen educational project, as symptomatic of a dogged 
though directionless refusal to give up on education (Allen 2015). I am struck that 
despite all such debasements, which supply an endless source of material for a long and 
established literature of educational critique, the romance of an educational good lives 
on. This conviction persists even in the limpid gaze of the most despairing educational 
critic [2]. Against this view, and inspired by a Nietzschean impulse that holds up to 
scrutiny our most cherished ideals, I take the odd persistence of that educational 
conviction as my point of departure. In an attempt to dislodge this belief so it may be 
held up for inspection I turn to some rather ancient educational precursors.  
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I develop an account of the educational good in late antiquity across three 
fragments (I-III). The first considers the educational good of the Roman tutor. The 
second and third fragments address the educational good as developed through Christian 
eschatology, that part of theology concerned with death, divine judgment, and the 
destiny of the soul. Early Christian baptismal practices are considered in the second, 
followed by the more familiar educational territory of the early monastery in the third. I 
make no attempt to link these fragments systematically, as if aspiring to a comprehensive 
historical and philosophical account of a period. Rather more modestly, I find traces of 
an idea that has since come to dominate, namely the conviction that education must if 
nothing else be good. This conviction is based upon a philosophical sleight of hand I 
claim, whereby the good of education is forever deferred. Educators, and those in their 
care, are expected to labour endlessly in the pursuit of a good they will never by 
definition be able to realise, only approximate. To seduce the educator and those to be 
educated into the pursuit of a good they will never achieve, a range of strategies are 
developed. In the first fragment we encounter the case of the Roman tutor who must 
convince his patron that his soul is sick, and that he requires the tutorÕs guidance. In the 
second fragment, those about to be baptised must be similarly persuaded that they are 
susceptible to all kinds of devilry. By implication, only a lifetime spent in service of an 
educational good of Christian extraction can save the soul from its fallen state. In the 
third fragment, we encounter the educational good in the early Christian monastery, 
discovering again that it is rarely manifested, and can only be approximated through the 
monkÕs unstinting effort and unquestionable obedience. In each case, those to be 
educated must develop a profound suspicion, if not fear of the body, as the seat of 
distraction if not devilry. The good of education is premised on a prior subjugation of 
the body. 
When related to our educational present, these fragments may appear distant, for 
indeed they are. Yet here is a possibility we must entertain, namely, that the great 
educational deferral of late Antiquity might survive, perhaps even thrive in an adjusted 
form today. 
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I. 
 
Western education inherits a rather icy perspective from the philosophical schools of 
ancient Greece, a point of view that denigrates this world in favour of another realm, or 
this life in favour of another way of living. Notwithstanding substantial variations 
between each philosophical school (Epicurean, Stoic, Sceptic, Platonist), each 
recommended its own system of life-denial. Each had its own regimen, which was 
attached to a decidedly abstract notion of the philosophical, and hence educational good 
that would be served through oneÕs obedience to its precepts (see Hadot 1995; 2001). 
Each philosophy insisted on a kind of deferral, operating with deference to the love of 
wisdom, or sophia that was at their root. Conceptions of wisdom varied widely, of course, 
as did recommendations for how one might work towards it. But common to each 
school was the following promise: philosophy would only offer a ÔforetasteÕ (Hadot 2004, 
4). According to the historian and philosopher of ancient philosophy, Pierre Hadot, a 
philosopher in this context only ever tends towards wisdom Ð wisdom can only be 
approximated in practice and never fully achieved [3]. Unlike the sage whose divine 
insights are inspired rather than reasoned, the philosopher is at best on the path that 
approaches wisdom. In the most extreme version of this argument, found in PlatoÕs 
Phaedo, wisdom is fully realised only with Ôthe release of the soul from the bodyÕ, that is, 
upon the philosopherÕs death (Plato 1993, 64c). The educational message is clear: ÒYou 
will orient yourself towards wisdom but forever remain in its shadowÓ. 
In late antiquity the Greek philosophical schools gradually dissipated. Another type 
of philosophical training now found favour with the aristocratic Roman elite. Along with 
the Ôbarbarian theosophyÕ of the early Christians (Brown 1971, 72), this rival tradition 
began to replace the educational figure of the revered philosopher, that teacher of the 
Hellenic world.  
An education in the various teachings of Greek philosophy was now expected of 
those Roman aristocrats who considered themselves cultured. Conceptions of the 
educational good taken from classical antiquity that had been crafted in each ancient 
philosophical school for a limited number of willing converts, were thereby passed on to 
a far more dispersed and diverse group of jobbing aristocrats, who were rather more 
concerned with maintaining a cultivated air, than they were with subordinating 
themselves to a specific philosophical order. Hence, in late antiquity, the Roman model 
of the educator-philosopher operates rather differently. Attempts are still made to bind 
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the educator to his pupil in a relationship where the educational good promised by the 
former is to be believed by the latter. Yet the educator in this era more commonly took 
the position of a private tutor or counsellor employed by a social superior, rather than 
the revered head of a philosophical school (see Foucault 2005, 136-44). This added 
something important to the plight of an educational good that is to be followed but 
forever deferred. It was now a rather urgent necessity that this promise of an educational 
good be tied to an art of seduction. 
The idea that a philosopher was a Ôdivine or inspired manÕ such as Socrates, or a 
professional entirely devoted to philosophical enquiry, such as Plato, gradually gave way 
to a more ÔdeprofessionalisedÕ conception of philosophy (Foucault 2005, 155). Indeed, it 
was possible to be an educator without being, strictly speaking, a philosopher. Those 
providing spiritual direction, offering systems for making sense of and giving direction to 
oneÕs life, no longer spoke from the relatively secure position of a philosophical school. 
Educators increasingly offered their counsel from positions that were subservient to 
power, being dependent upon their patrons for support. And so, at its extreme, this 
position demanded that the educator combine his moral and spiritual superiority Ð which 
was the justification for his employment after all Ð with servile gestures and an almost 
obsequious level of tact. These hired educators were not latter-day Sophists however, 
winning customers by promising much and delivering little. At least they did not present 
themselves so. They continued to work within the tradition of ancient Greek philosophy, 
which had long been set against cheap imitators of wisdom. Wisdom, for these 
contemporary Roman tutors represented more than a technique or a body of knowledge 
that could be bought as and when convenient; it demanded lifelong commitment. 
With the Roman tutor we have what would appear to be a significant moment in 
the history of educational subjectivity. Here we have the makings of a social role in 
which the educator experiences great responsibility Ð the care of the soul no less Ð 
combined with a nagging sense of insecurity, the perpetual fear that oneÕs masters will 
decide that oneÕs mastery is no longer required. Hence, as Foucault (2011; 2005, 372-380) 
observes, there is in the Roman period, extensive discussion about the relationship 
between parrhesia, or speaking freely, and its antithesis, which is flattery. The problem is 
this: How to prevent the educator and social inferior from only telling his patron what he 
wishes to hear? How to build a relationship in which frank speech Ð necessary for 
reorienting the soul of oneÕs patron no less Ð can be safely practised? 
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It seems that the educator responds to this impossible situation by developing and 
strengthening the relationship that binds the pupil to the teacher. The teacher cannot rely 
upon reputation or respect alone, nor can the educator expect to hold the pupilÕs 
attention by force, since the pupil is now the educatorÕs patron. It is necessary, in other 
words, to establish an educational tradition that is driven to convince its patrons of the 
benevolence of education before all else.  
This is our scenario then, and my basic argument: In late antiquity the educational 
good is promoted from a position of weakness, the educatorÕs weakness in the case of 
the hired teacher. It is the product of a servile relationship between the educator and his 
patron. It is the expression not simply of a need to convince, but also a need to please. 
The educator must justify himself to his employer, explaining that the educational 
remedy he prescribes is worthwhile, even though in the tradition of Greek philosophy it 
may bring considerable discomfort when it tells him that he lacks virtue, that he may 
need to fundamentally reorient his being, and so on. In effect, the educator must 
convince his patron that despite these necessary discomforts, this education he has on 
offer is essential to his employerÕs prosperity and wellbeing.  
One tactic on behalf of teachers who found themselves in such an unenviable 
position was to lighten the load of their guidance. Accordingly the educated would be 
encouraged to exercise only a Ôgentle violence on the bodyÕ (Brown 2008, 27) as 
measured as it was forceful. It would be futile, these tutors counselled, to overrule the 
body in such a complete and tyrannical manner that it be injured through excessive 
denial and self-discipline. This recommendation had a second advantage, however, since 
aristocrats were also told, and subsequently told one another (see Brown 2008, 22) that 
they would not govern others well if they could not first govern themselves. Perhaps 
rather conveniently from the tutorÕs perspective, influential patrons were invited to apply 
the same principle of measure to the government of those beneath them, as they would 
to themselves.  
An exemplary text of this tradition would be GalenÕs On the Passions and Errors of the 
Soul. This text is educational in a dual sense, defining the role of the educator whilst 
attempting to educate the taste of those seeking to employ such an individual. The reader 
is advised that powerful and rich individuals are in need of honest educators, since most 
educators will remain silent out of fear, or will engage in flattery. Consequently, those 
wishing to be educated must first make themselves weak [4]. 
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The noble reader is advised: If after several days your guide has not reproached 
you for your passions, which must assuredly be clouding your reason, assume that he has 
either been negligent, that he is unwilling to help, or that Ôhe remains silent because he is 
afraid to reproach youÕ. It is for this last reason that you must always Ôlook upon him as 
your delivererÕ and tell him this, making him promise from the outset to reveal your 
passions as if he were saving you Ôfrom an illness of the bodyÕ (Galen 1963, 33). There 
will be no recriminations. If your guide still fails to reproach you, employ another 
(though this too may fail if you have acquired a reputation for intolerance). If you wish 
to receive honest guidance you must become known as someone who endures if not 
welcomes unwelcome advice. Such noble individuals will eventually be rewarded by the 
attentions of many a willing educator who will at last feel free to give Ôtrue correctionÕ 
(Galen 1963, 35). 
Galen presents an argument for the importance of the educator who must be held 
in esteem, indeed valued most, when his advice and guidance is displeasing. Even 
insolent educators are to be tolerated with restraint. Those wishing to be educated must 
realise, Galen claims, that their greatest foe is the self-love which deludes them into 
believing that there is nothing wrong with their soul: Only Ôthe wise man is free from 
faultÕ, and such men are very rare indeed, which Ôis why you hear the philosophers of old 
saying that to be wise is to become like GodÕ (Galen 1963, 34). Most people who aspire 
to an educated soul will urgently require the assistance of a guide of the type Galen has in 
mind. This educator will also be a kind of doctor, for these roles were not yet clearly 
delineated. Indeed, in the medical and philosophical advice of Galen, and also Plutarch, 
even oneÕs deportment during sex is to be carefully prescribed (Brown 2008, 18). Clearly, 
this kind of educator must feel free to identify faults of the most intimate kind, where the 
pupil (who is also potentially his emperor) believes none to exist.  
The educator must also make himself weak, though in a different way, since he 
must still insist on the value of his employment. Despite his long training, his exemplary 
self-discipline, temperance and tranquillity, his poise and his achievements, he will remain 
humble, for this humility distinguishes him for service. He will Ôlook with scorn on gloryÕ, 
holding Ôonly the truth in esteemÕ, and will remain alert to those passions that might still 
claim him. He will not decide that all must acknowledge his excellence, which has taken 
him a lifetime to cultivate, since Ôthe desire to have all men praise me is like the desire to 
possess all thingsÕ, it is symptomatic of greed (Galen 1963, 59). This educator will be 
content to remain unpopular at times, even resented. Moreover, he will be generous, and 
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proceed as if any member of the aristocracy, however ravaged by Ôdiseases of the soulÕ 
can be redeemed (Galen 1963, 53). The educator will, in effect, commit himself to 
unstinting effort, combining the poise of an educated man and the airs of a cultivated 
soul, with the humility of a noble servant, who seduces his master with his generosity of 
spirit. 
In the first century, Emperor NeroÕs advisor, Seneca, devises a similar argument in 
favour of the educatorÕs frank speech: again we find how the educator should be valued 
for saying things that one would not wish to hear (Seneca 2004; 2007). In the second 
century, Emperor Marcus Aurelius was taught by a sequence of social inferiors. Relations 
with his favourite teacher, Junius Rusticus were at times a little stormy, yet Marcus 
credits his teacher with not only reforming his character, but also for teaching him the 
virtue of indulgence, a virtue which Rusticus embodied each time Marcus became 
irascible. Marcus thereby testifies to the importance of a relationship of tolerance, though 
now the argument is made from the perspective of the student (Hadot 2001). Essentially 
we have the same recurring problem: the educatorÕs role must be justified to those in 
power, and those in power must in turn justify to themselves the educatorÕs intrusive 
advice. This educator must be shown to have the best intentions, to be sincere and 
devoted. This sincerity and devotion is what gives the educator licence to challenge his 
patron when necessary, so as to better guide his soul. By speaking freely at moments that 
are carefully chosen, the educator seeks to establish a bond with his pupil. In effect, the 
educator declares: ÒLook, I risk telling you the truth, so I must be on your side.Ó 
By the fourth century, the survival of these educational ideals becomes all the more 
remarkable against the backdrop of an empire that had become Ôfrankly authoritarianÕ. 
Indeed, it is tempting to view this entire educational tradition as being rather quaint, if 
not completely out of touch with the politics of a Ôvast, despotic empireÕ (Brown 1992, 
7). Despotic rule would have, one presumes, little patience for the cultured refinements 
of educated persons who still believe in the role of Ôdisinterested advisorÕ, the figure of 
philosopher-tutor, or more broadly, the educated supplicant, who would Ôsway the will of 
the powerfulÕ through the art of honest persuasion. It seems odd at first sight that paideia 
(as this system of education and refinement was more broadly known) was still 
championed, bringing with it the expectation of Ôa benevolent, because cultivated, 
exercise of authorityÕ, where all members of the upper class benefit from common codes 
of courtesy and self-control (Brown 1992, 4). Yet despotism over vast territories requires 
extended networks of support in order to function, and within these frameworks paideia 
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thrived, greasing the wheels of the imperial machinery by giving it the appearance of 
respectability (see Brown 1992, 30-1).  
More than this, however, it expressed the morality of an increasingly weakened 
aristocracy, living in a world Ôcharacterized by a chilling absence of legal restraints on 
violence in the exercise of powerÕ. A Ôlurking fear of arbitrary violenceÕ, caused elites 
fearful of maintaining their position to fall back on the advantages of their education 
(Brown 1992, 50). Educators could in turn appeal to a common fear of that Ôtide of 
horrorÕ which Ôlapped close to the feet of all educated personsÕ (Brown 1992, 52), who 
were only exempt from corporal punishment because of their noble status. Educators 
could appeal to patrons who recognised the advantages of a culture of refinement in 
which anger is seen as a Ôfailure in decorumÕ, and clemency is viewed as a manifestation 
of the dignity and poise of the powerful (Brown 1992, 55). It was sufficiently obvious 
that ceremony and decorum Ôdid not simply exalt the powerful; it controlled them, by 
ritualizing their responses and bridling their raw nature through measured gesturesÕ 
(Brown 1992, 56). The noble ideal of character formation was then, a moral formation 
born of weakness, the weakness of a class of notables seeking to maintain its position. It 
assured that within the imperial system cultured individuals were still treated as such, and 
on occasion, favoured members of their class would even be permitted to speak back to 
the powerful as educated supplicants. This was the context, then, within which the 
seductions of the educator and employee gained purchase. It would not last. Gradually, 
the philosopher-educator and educated aristocrat was replaced by the Christian bishop 
(Brown 1992), who would also seek to give unwelcome advice to his emperor, though 
this advice was now accompanied by the tacit or implied threat of GodÕs wrath if left 
unheeded. 
 
II. 
 
The education of the Roman elite was built upon a need to seduce the patron into 
believing in the benevolence of the educator, who was also, in many cases, a social 
inferior. At a similar time, Christian practices addressed to the other end of the social 
spectrum were establishing their own implicit conception of the educational good. These 
practices operated in an analogous though opposite way, now convincing those to be 
educated from a position of power that they are weak and in need of redemption.  
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At first, Christianity was just another sect gaining influence as the Roman Empire 
degenerated into a Ôcolossal bureaucratic apparatusÕ whose workings most individuals 
Ôcould not fathom or influenceÕ. In late antiquity, the EmpireÕs power to Ôrouse feelings 
of citizenship and commitment to the stateÕ was dissipating, leading Roman subjects to 
seek meaning elsewhere (Sloterdijk 2001, 170-1). Members of the Roman elite employed 
philosophers in the household who would give their lives meaning and direction. 
Wanting philosophy for themselves, they looked with disgust at that other great 
philosophical inheritance, which was to be found in the sects that were sweeping through 
the Empire, with all their Ôvagabonds, preachers, moralists, cults and communitiesÕ. In 
this context, cultivated Romans initially Ôturned up their nosesÕ just as much at Christians 
as they did at other sects such as the tattered, shameless Cynics (Sloterdijk 2001, 171). 
Christianity would, of course, eventually triumph over its detractors. Not only would it 
incorporate itself into the ideology of the ruling order, it would also eventually redefine 
and take over what it meant to be both cultured and educated. The other sects including 
the Cynics would only survive to the extent that they were incorporated into Christianity. 
The ÔsoulÕ would eventually become the exclusive property of Christian theology. 
And with it, the cultivation of an Ôeducated soulÕ would become a distinctly Christian 
pursuit, whereby the most educated amongst us are expected to be the most chaste, the 
most vegetarian in our desires. This Christian appropriation of the soul was not 
immediate, however. A first century follower of Christ such as Paul the Apostle, had little 
interest in the soul as distinct from the body, speaking in the latter case only of the 
ÔfleshÕ. The flesh stood for the general condition of humankind soon to be judged at the 
second coming of Christ. This was the plight of human beings Ôcaught in a hurried 
instantÕ as they anticipated the Second Coming (Brown 2008, 49). That hurried instant 
became rather prolonged, however. As Christ failed to materialise first century Christians 
were forced to consider the possibility that their collective sojourn on earth would be 
somewhat extended. It was now worth asking, as the ancients once had, how in this 
prolonged earthly existence the soul might begin to protect itself from the impulses of 
the body. 
Christianity borrowed extensively from its philosophical predecessors. In 356AD 
the Ôfirst monkÕ, Anthony the Great is said to have offered the following recognisably 
Stoic advice: On the day of his death he said; ÒLive as if you were going to die every day, 
devoting attention to yourselves and remembering my exhortationsÓ. The sixth century 
monk and abbot, Dorotheus of Gaza said something similar: ÒLet us pay attention to 
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ourselves, my brothers, and let us be vigilant, while we still have timeÉ Since the 
beginning of our conversation two or three hours have elapsed, and we have come closer 
to death; yet we see without fear that we are wasting our timeÓ (both cited in Hadot 
2004, 242-3). Such meditations on death were intended to intensify those processes by 
which one inspected oneÕs life. Wisdom, now reconceived as knowledge of God, 
remained an other-worldly thing approached only through death. The fourth century 
monk and ascetic Evagrius of Pontus developed the analogous Platonic theme, arguing 
that the soul is separated from the body as its precondition for knowing God. Hence, the 
monastic life would be both Òa training for death and a flight from the bodyÓ (cited in 
Hadot 2004, 246).  
With Christian ascetic practices we encounter in its revised form the philosopherÕs 
desire to educate the passions. This was to be achieved by minimizing oneÕs pleasure in 
objects. As the second century convert Clement of Alexandria recognised, whilst pagan 
philosophers attempted to educate their desires, Christians went much further. In a way 
that radicalised Stoic indifference, Clement argued that Òour ideal is not to experience 
desire at allÓ (cited in Brown 2008, 31). In principle, the egoistic self would be so 
undermined that it would cease to desire completely, allowing the ascetic practitioner to 
finally arrive at a point where, as Dorotheus of Gaza put it,  Òhe has no will of his ownÓ. 
This person would not Òwant things to be as he wishesÓ since Òhe wishes them to be as 
they areÓ (cited in Hadot 2004, 245).  
The body nevertheless remained the training ground for the soul, furnishing it with 
all manner of distractions that were to be overcome. Ascetic activities such as fasting 
were designed to reconstitute the body in such a way that body and soul would no longer 
be enslaved to the appetites (see Brown 2008, 223). Even illness was considered an 
educational opportunity. Clement advised the following: ÒYou must consider your illness 
a pedagogue which leads you to what is profitable to you Ð that is, teaches you to despise 
the body and corporeal things and all that flows away, is the source of worries, and is 
perishable, so that you may belong completely to the part which is above, Émaking this 
life down below Ð as Plato says Ð a training for deathÓ (cited in Hadot 2004, 246). The 
body may be loathsome, but it was also the best educational tool one had [5]. 
These Christian practices were clearly oriented to the formation of a spiritual elite 
that would occupy positions in the monastery, church and eventually the court of the 
King. Yet from the outset Christianity was a popular philosophy; hence the Nietzschean 
line: ÔChristianity is Platonism for the Ôcommon peopleÓ (Nietzsche 1998, 4). Indeed as 
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Hadot argues, perhaps here is the key point of distinction between Platonism and its 
Christian successors (Hadot 2004, 251-2). Whilst Augustine of Hippo adopted a Platonic 
line Ð arguing that we must pay attention to the distractions of the body, and educate the 
soul if we are to contemplate God Ð from the Augustinian point of view, the problem 
with Platonism was that it was unable to convert the masses. Christianity is far more 
optimistic, believing that all souls are in principle recoverable.  
The Ôflight from the bodyÕ inaugurated by Hellenistic philosophy persists with 
Christianity as it develops strategies to control the appetites, restrain the passions, and 
thereby educate the soul (Hadot 2004, 252). Christianity continues to pursue objectives 
that remain ultimately beyond our reach. Down below in this life that persists despite 
everything it is taught to abhor about itself, the message is clear: ÒYou can still aspire to a 
virtuous life despite all your bodily distractions, despite your debased existence. In 
pursuing virtue you will begin to find the tranquillity you so desire. So go forth, seek 
tranquillity, make it your primary objective, but remember the path is difficult; only the 
most virtuous will come close to achieving it.Ó Only those who have been educated 
correctly can approach God. In Christian terms, it is the promised condition for those 
who have turned their back on evil and come to know God. The early Christian ritual of 
baptism held such a promise, allowing the baptized to be reborn a little closer to God Ð 
their first birth, of course, was in sin.  
 
* 
 
Early Christian baptism involved a death of sorts, imitating the death and resurrection of 
Christ [6]. Consequently, preparation for baptism could be understood as an Ôenterprise 
in mortificationÕ by which one demonstrated the extent to which one was willing to die 
voluntarily, ending oneÕs earlier, sinful life through an act of devotion (Foucault 2014, 
156). These baptismal rituals demanded rigorous preparation and total commitment, 
obeying the precept: Ôno baptism without prior teachingÕ (Foucault 2014, 105). The soul 
to be purified would have to be first educated, and this education would again be one of 
denial and deferral. 
With this education of the soul there was the potential to extend mortification of 
the flesh beyond its baptismal confines. Exercises in mortification, such as fasting and 
sexual abstinence were understood according to a demonology whereby spirits, unable to 
enjoy bodily pleasures directly, are forced to enjoy them vicariously through their human 
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host. Consequently, these evil spirits are presumed most active when the body is most 
moved by those pleasures they seek to share (see Kelly 2004, 126-7). For this reason a 
quest for spiritual purity on behalf of the Christian becomes associated with a fight to 
limit pleasurable activities. The vitality of the body is still to be limited, but this exercise 
in mortification is less oriented towards the death that must precede rebirth, and more 
towards a constant practice of life-denial that extends either side of baptism. We have 
here, then, the roots of a practice that could extend to occupy the entire life Ð a life of 
denials Ð of the practicing Christian. 
There was some disagreement concerning when, at which point exactly, baptismal 
purification occurred. Was it during immersion itself, or was purification a prerequisite 
for baptism? In the former case, baptism in water was perhaps analogous to baptism in 
blood, where it was believed that the act of martyrdom could also secure oneÕs soul. 
Unlike martyrdom, baptism in water presented a specific difficulty, as the soul would 
remain attached to the body after the event. In this case, rather a lot, perhaps too much, 
was expected of this moment of purification. Hence a whole machinery of self-
purification prior to baptism was devised. The baptised would not only be expected to 
believe in the moment of baptism through an act of faith, he or she would now also be 
expected to commit wholeheartedly to the educational process which preceded it. 
Foucault identifies this switch with Tertullian, who converted to Christianity towards the 
end of the second century: ÒWe are not bathed in the baptismal water in order to be 
purified, but we are bathed in the baptismal water because we are purifiedÓ (cited in 
Foucault 2014, 117). For this prior education involving purification and mortification to 
be a success, it was necessary to convince the soon-to-be baptised that their education 
was worthy of attention. And so in a different context, serving a different purpose, we 
find a familiar problem: how to convince the educatee of the educational good.  
There was already as we have seen a pagan response to this problem. At a similar 
time the Roman elite were employing educators who were expected to offer intimate 
guidance. According to tutors such as Galen, oneÕs superiors were expected to value this 
guidance most when it was most unwelcome. It was hoped that Ôfrank speechÕ or 
parrhesia, would bind the educator to his pupil, who was also his superior and employer. 
The Christian solution is rather different, or at least, it is at the point of developing into 
something very different in the second and third centuries. It is to give the care of the 
soul over to the pupil. The educator remains in place, but becomes more of an 
educational conduit than a self-possessed guide. When things go awry, the educator can 
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now reply: ÒYou have nobody to blame but yourself.Ó So, we have two subjective 
techniques, two approaches designed to bind the pupil to the teacher, and by proxy, to 
the educational good: the obsequious-heroic plea of the Roman educator and inferior, 
and the knowing look of the Christian teacher. 
At the end of the second century, practices of catechesis Ð those procedures and 
exercises considered necessary preparation for baptism Ð were becoming 
institutionalised. This can be seen in The Apostolic Tradition, an early third century text 
attributed to Hippolytus and considered to be one of the first clear accounts of early 
Christian baptismal ritual in the West (see Kelly 2004). Its contents are nevertheless 
disputed, since the original text does not survive, leading scholars to question whether 
some of the practices described might date from the fourth century or later (see Johnson 
2007, 101-110). According to the surviving text, candidates for admission would be 
presented to the ÒteachersÓ by their ÒsponsorsÓ, as part of an initial examination during 
which the candidateÕs intentions and prior life were put to the test (cited in Johnson 
2007, 97). A number of professions were prohibited, including brothel keepers, 
prostitutes, unfaithful concubines, men who kept concubines, magicians, astrologers, 
pagan priests, gladiators, soldiers and charioteers (Johnson 2007, 97). Pagan teachers 
were also excluded (it would appear there was a clear division at this point in history 
between secular teachers and Christian educators, presumably because the former taught 
the pagan arts [see Cramer 1993, 16]). 
If admitted, the catechumen would be expected to lead a life of some months or 
years that accorded with rules dictated by tradition. This period of training concluded 
with another examination of how piously the catechumen had lived since joining. Those 
considered ready for baptism entered a more intense preparation, involving ascetic 
practices (such as prayer, fasting, kneeling) that were through their rigor Ôintended to test 
the authenticity the faithÕ (Foucault 2014, 150). Two days before baptism, the 
catechumen underwent an exorcism carried out by the bishop. As the bishop uttered 
imprecations to drive out Satan, the catechumen was expected to listen Ôwithout moving 
of fidgetingÕ, proving that Ôthe spirit of evil is no longer master of his soulÕ (Foucault 
2014, 151). 
Exorcism was not simply a matter of purging the soul in preparation for baptism; 
it was a procedure in which those to be purified were expected to manifest the truth that 
they were ready for baptism (see Foucault 2014, 146). There was clearly a voluntary 
dimension to baptismal initiation, where it was believed that Ôlack of success in expelling 
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the alien spirits was due to the candidateÕs failure to receive his instructions in good faithÕ 
(Kelly 2004, 273). Indeed, Cramer (1993, 11) reaches a similar conclusion with regard to 
the baptismal implications of The Apostolic Tradition, claiming that ÔuncleannessÕ at this late 
juncture was considered the catechumenÕs fault, since the devil could not have survived 
this far into the rite without assistance. AugustineÕs address to his candidates was 
similarly pointed: 
 
With prayers to God and rebukes we withstand the wiles of the ancient enemy, while you 
carry on with you own prayers and heartfelt contrition, so that you may be rescued from 
the power of darkness and brought to the kingdom of light. This now is your task, this is 
your labour. We heap upon you the curses that his wickedness deserves; but you on your 
side declare a most glorious war against him by your aversion and your pious renunciation 
(cited in Kelly 2004, 115). 
 
When baptism occurred, a last test was applied which would finally allow the Holy Spirit 
to descend into the soul of the baptised. Three questions were asked: Do you believe in 
the Father? Do you believe in the Son? Do you believe in the Holy Spirit? The baptised 
would reply to each, and be submerged three times (see Foucault 2014, 153; Johnson 
2007, 99). Yet the ceremonies continue: ÒAnd when he has done exorcising, let him [the 
bishop] breathe in their face. And when he has sealed their foreheads and their ears and 
their noses, let him raise them up. And let them spend all the night in vigil, and let them 
be read to and instructedÓ (Hippolytus cited in Kelly 2004, 84). The devil, one presumes, 
was still present and Ôfighting for control of his victimsÕ who, once cleansed, had to be 
safeguarded against re-entry (Kelly 2004, 88). The candidate for baptism had been tested 
repeatedly, and with increased severity, right until the moment of purification. It was as if 
everything that could be done had been done to assure success. Procedures had been 
instituted, attention had been lavished, and at each stage a concerned gaze was fixed on 
the soul of the candidate only further intensifying the pressure to succeed.  
The level of purification achieved was not to be considered absolute. It was 
necessary to insist that those who had been purified through baptism or any other rite 
would always Ôremain a little impureÕ, at least in this life (Foucault 2014, 121). Hence, the 
work that must be performed on oneÕs soul would be never-ending. Tranquillity would 
be desired, and fervently pursued, but never entirely achieved. 
 
* 
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The soul is now understood rather differently, compared to the soul of Greek antiquity. 
This change can be observed in Tertullian who asserted the inescapable presence of 
original sin, and hence, the importance of those social conventions that human frailty 
demands if the soul is to be protected. For Tertullian, nobody however pure will ever 
have the strength to step outside convention and remain faithful to God. All must 
submit to the protection of the Church. 
Rather schematically, and risking over-simplification, we might describe the 
transition in the following terms: Unlike the Platonic soul, which had knowledge of 
higher things but forgot them when it became associated with matter, or the soul of the 
Neo-Platonists which Ôfalls into matterÕ (Foucault 2014, 125), becoming Ôharmed and 
diminishedÕ by association (MacIntyre 2009, 22), in late antiquity the Christian soul is 
understood in terms of the original fall of Adam since which it has been diverted by 
pride, if not indeed occupied by evil. The Christian soul still exists in contrast to the 
body, and we are to live in the hope that it will be liberated when the latter passes on. 
But the education of this soul has changed. As Foucault argues, it is not to be educated 
through a Platonic process of ascent and rediscovery by which it aspires to wisdom (and 
death), but rather through a constant battle with the evil it contains. The risk, clearly 
enough, is that the soulÕs demons will follow it into the afterlife. Hence the Ôpedagogical 
dramaÕ through which the soul is redeemed, is no longer one of Ôprogressive 
illuminationÕ; it has become rather more urgent and dangerous than that (Foucault 2014, 
125). This renders even more remote the possibility of achieving a divine state of wisdom 
through strength of will alone. Perhaps Ôno one can rescue themselves from this 
conditionÕ, for to do so Ôwould require an act of willÕ, yet 'every act of will is infected by 
the very condition from which it needs to be rescuedÕ. It is still worth trying, but success 
will now be forever reliant upon GodÕs grace. The Christian subject must labour towards 
a transformation of the soul that must by definition remain Ôincomplete in this present 
lifeÕ (MacIntyre 2009, 25).  
This pedagogical drama was contingent upon a transformation of the figure of 
Satan himself. In the Old and arguably also the New Testaments, Satan was not yet 
viewed as the personification of evil. He was a mere ÔfunctionaryÕ of divine government, 
Ôcharged with testing and disciplining MankindÕ (Kelly 2006, 7). As a pedagogical figure, 
he can be viewed as the ultimate external examiner, a little over-zealous at times, who 
tests the faith of GodÕs people. In late antiquity this changed as Satan was demoted from 
his position in divine government by theologians such as Tertullian and Origen, 
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becoming instead GodÕs adversary, the personification of radical evil. In educational 
terms, Satan, the greatest external examiner we have ever known, was henceforth to be 
cast out from the educational scene. Satan Ôthe examinerÕ was replaced by the Satan the 
bringer of evil. The educational consequences were profound: Since their external 
examiner had departed from the scene in a cloud of dark recriminations, Christians 
would now be forced to examine themselves, fearing that if they failed to do so 
adequately, Satan would return in his more evil guise, and take up residence within.  
In this respect the fear of a satanic occupant only serves to intensify the 
educational mission of Christianity since Ôthe more Christian one is, the more one is at 
riskÉthe more the devil ragesÕ against his expulsion from the soul (Foucault 2014, 125). 
And so the time of baptism becomes a time of great peril, since the devil or demons 
facing expulsion will become all the more furious. The path leading up to and ultimately 
beyond baptism also has its share of danger. Hence, the pupil of early Christianity must 
take extra care, and pay particular attention to his or her education. This educational 
commitment is only intensified by fear, by the realisation that the battle against evil is 
constantly with us. The pupil of Christianity must know that he is always in danger: 
ÔDanger never subsides; he is never safe; he must never relaxÕ (Foucault 2014, 126). The 
more the soul is educated, the more the devil is to be driven out, the greater the peril. 
The demand to examine oneself and the (unending) battle against imperfection only 
intensifies as the examination proceeds: the devil rages most when cornered. 
Foucault claims that a new kind of fear is introduced here; Ôa sense of fear about 
oneself, of what one isÕ which is a more radical in its reach, and constantly present than a 
Ôfear of destinyÕ or of GodÕs wrath (Foucault 2014, 127). It is the fear that we might fail 
in freeing ourselves from SatanÕs grip, with the implication that one must toil ceaselessly 
until the moment of final deliverance. We might claim that a whole subjectivity and a 
whole educational tradition, is built upon this fear of the self. Again we observe how the 
educational good that still haunts us today is developed and promoted from a position of 
original weakness; in this case, the implied weakness of the sinner who fears for his soul. 
We discover that education is a constant requirement; one needs to become educated in 
this pre-baptismal Christian sense, because it is the only resource you have in this fight 
against the evil that resides in your soul. 
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III. 
 
Histories of education are more at ease when they locate their object within recognisable 
institutional confines. From this perspective, early Christian baptismal practices are not 
recognisably educational, or at least, they hardly seem central to a history of education. 
Since monastic practices remain with us more obviously in contemporary schools and 
universities, early Christian monasticism would appear a more fitting topic for discussion. 
Whilst it is true that early monasteries did indeed incubate and develop educational 
practices (though they were comparatively marginal institutions educating only a minority 
of the population, far fewer than those baptised), a history of education which pays 
monasticism undue attention risks strengthening the conceit of our most educated 
contemporaries, confining the history of education to its most illustrious ancestral 
manifestations, conveying the assumed distinction of an ancient institutional pedigree. If 
we are to disturb the educational good upon which such conceit rests, we must insist on 
a wider definition of education, whilst doubling back and questioning its strongholds. 
Hence I consider the educational good as it appeared under early monasticism in this 
third and final fragment, without wishing it any privilege over the educational good 
asserted by the private Roman tutor, or that which was inflicted upon the baptised. 
 
* 
 
Despite the educated credentials that monasteries would later acquire, becoming famous 
as places of learning and culture, it is worth noting that monks were initially renowned as 
uncultured individuals. Crucially, they were devoid of paideia (Brown 1992, 71)[7]. The 
first monks were uneducated, lowly and contemptible.  
Upon such foundations Christianity continued its journey into the interior, 
eventually transforming the grubby ascetic into the disciplined vanguard of a new elite 
that specialised in spiritual warfare. Here the violence of fourth century monastic 
vigilantes, ransacking towns for idols, tearing down synagogues and pagan shrines, even 
forming lynch mobs (Brown 1971, 104), can be viewed as exterior manifestations of 
those far more constantly exerted inner aggressions by which monks disciplined 
themselves in acts of pious devotion. These monks were Ôwarriors of the spiritÕ (Smith 
2011, 38) and yet, despite the decidedly militant language some adopted when speaking 
of spiritual matters (see Smith 2011, 89-96), it was not all violence, or at least, some of 
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the violence was ÔbenignÕ in appearance. Externally speaking, such monastic orders were 
not only engaged in acts of terror, but also installed themselves as distributors of welfare 
to those they persecuted (see Brown 1971, 110) establishing a familiar relationship 
between Christian charity and Christian violence. On an individual basis, the violence of 
monastic self-discipline was matched by its claim to be the most benignant of exertions 
ever made upon the human soul.  
Attempts to erase the presence of sin were now connected to the production of a 
form of knowledge about oneself measured according to its cosmic depth. Within the 
walls of the monastic institution, another interiority is constructed. The ÔpenitentÕ is no 
longer simply asked to exhibit him or herself as a fallen being requiring salvation, rather 
there is the expectation to divide and inspect his or her being, multiplying its potential 
for sin.  
This newfound depth was cosmic, rather than personal, since the details of a 
monkÕs inner life were expressive of exterior forces. Hence, to take the example of sexual 
renunciation; it was not a matter of treating individual desires, proclivities and so on, as if 
they were Ôlodged in the isolated bodyÕ. Rather, the task facing the monk and early 
Christian Ôdrew its seriousnessÕ from the cosmic scale of the battle, where those energies 
pulsing through the body were Ôthe same energies that kept the stars aliveÕ (Brown 2008, 
xlv-xlvi). Individual privacy had little meaning in this context. 
In this cosmic arena, sex itself was rather upstaged. It was Ôovershadowed by the 
most obscene disruption of all in the texture of the universeÕ Ð this being Ôthe parting of 
the body and soul at deathÕ. Sexual renunciation or at least discipline, gave a Ômanageable 
face to the diffuse horror of mortalityÕ, providing an outlet where Christians could gain 
some measure of control. By denying those forces which were expressive of life, of that 
drive for continuity through reproduction, radical Christians were able to Ôinstall a place 
in the human heart where the footsteps of death might be muffledÕ (Brown 2008, xlvi). 
The point was to pre-empt death by practicing mortifications of oneÕs own. This might 
appear rather excessive, denying what little pleasure life has to offer so as to outwit 
death, yet for early Christians life itself was hardly preferable. Their earthly existence was 
considered the Ôproduct of an over-riding demonic tyrannyÕ (Brown 2008, 84) the end of 
which had been inaugurated by Christ. It was the duty of Christians to hasten the 
collapse of that tyranny. In this context, oneÕs refusal to perpetuate life by removing 
oneself from reproduction was eminently justifiable [8].  
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Mortification of the flesh was however, not entirely negative. In the case of Origen 
(an influential ascetic who some claim willingly had himself castrated) we can observe a 
revived Platonism whereby earthly pleasures were considered mere Ôslurred echoesÕ of 
those heavenly delights reserved for the pious (Brown 2008, 173). In a more widespread 
sense, mortifications were positive in that they were carried out for the sake of the soul, 
which had been tied during its earthly sojourn to the body that was now in denial. In the 
monastery, these practices became highly developed. Whilst penitence sought to rescue 
the soul from its fallen state, monasticism attempted to refine the soul it rescued, turning 
its attention to those recesses where sin might hide. Monasticism still implied a life of 
penance, yet penance was now tied to a quest to cultivate oneÕs soul.  
Traceable to the third century, Christian monasticism was initially a way of life 
practiced by a few solitary figures living alone, or in small groups, either in the desert or 
on the fringe of society. Generally uneducated, and certainly humble, these figures were 
outcasts. The subsequent history of Christian monasticism is the history of their 
institutionalisation, it is a history of the social outcast who becomes socially useful. John 
Cassian, a late fourth century theologian, is credited with introducing this humble, 
eastern monasticism to the West in a more respectable institutional guise. He describes 
how those seeking admission to the monastery must remain at the door of the monastery 
for ten days, during which the established monks heap abuse on the visitor. Only those 
who endure such humiliation would be admitted, exchanging their clothes for the habit 
of the order, renouncing all prior wealth, becoming thereby entirely dependent. The 
second phase would take a year, during which the candidate would live at the outskirts of 
the monastery performing menial tasks. Following such tests of patience, obedience, 
submission and humility, the candidate would finally be admitted (see Foucault 2014, 
264-5). An indefinite period followed, during which the novice would be taught to 
further renounce his will. Any wishes or inclinations that contradicted his orders, even if 
they were never realised, were to be confessed to an elder. Each monk was expected to 
Ôobey in everything and to hide nothingÕ, to Ôobey exhaustively and exhaustively tell what 
one isÕ (Foucault 2014, 266). 
Rather importantly for our purposes, the monastic institution was not reliant on 
the greatness of its teachers or spiritual leaders, who would transfer their wisdom 
downwards. Indeed, these teachers might even be rather inept if not positively 
misguided. The monastic life was still a philosophical life in the ancient sense; reorienting 
the soul towards wisdom, yet it did not require the guidance of a Ôgreat philosopherÕ in 
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order to function (Foucault 2014, 267-9). This was a sensible precaution indeed, given 
the susceptibility of all Christians to temptation and sin; for even great monks and 
spiritual leaders could fall from grace. In the kind of monastic order envisaged by 
Cassian, and later by Benedict [9], it was the Ôcorporate body of the monasteryÕ rather 
than the piety of any single leader, which Ôbridles the dangerous assertion of the 
individual will and its accompanying cravingsÕ (Coon 2011, 76). Obedience remained 
absolutely necessary to monastic life, yet students were not obedient because of the 
greatness of the teacher who knew better than they did what they needed; rather, they 
were obedient for the sake of obedience, remaining obedient even when the teacher is no 
longer worthy of it. Elders and teachers were not thereby given licence to fail their 
students; they too would be subject to the strictures of monastic life. And yet, the 
monastic institution did not depend upon their excellence. Such teachers did not yet 
carry the success of education, and the educational encounter, on their conscience. 
When obedience becomes the prime directive, what gives obedience its value is 
Ôneither the quality of the order nor the quality of the person who gives itÕ (Foucault 
2014, 269). Monastic obedience does not aspire to a relationship in which the masterÕs 
competence is passed directly to the student. The fact that the student obeys whatever 
the order, is more important. Hence Cassian cites with approval a whole number of 
absurd orders and appalling requests for obedience, to make his point that obedience is 
an essential condition of monastic life (see Foucault 2014, 269-70).  
The monk obeys so as to become obedient, ideally reaching a state of obedience so 
absolute that he is ready to obey even before he receives the order. Furthermore, when 
orders are left wanting, the monk must see to it that events take on Ôthe form and value 
of an orderÕ Ð the  monk fills the world with orders, experiencing everything as an order. 
Ultimately, there Ôcan be no act in the monkÕs life that is not a response to an order or, at 
the least, a reaction to permission givenÕ (Foucault 2014, 271). 
In part the monk experiences everything as an order because he is expected to 
place himself Ôas low as possible in relation to everyone elseÕ. Effectively the monk, 
believing himself to be a sinner, must Ôconsider himself more humble than any of his 
companionsÕ accepting their wishes as if they were orders (Foucault 2014, 273). His 
extreme humility, giving himself over to the will of others, prepares the monk for the 
ultimate objective, which is to cease willing entirely. And so, whilst monasteries might be 
celebrated in the popular imagination for their great endurance, surviving the upheavals 
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of history so that they could preserve and pass on culture to future generations, their 
philosophical outlook and educational ethos was one of extreme submission and inertia.  
Excessive self-discipline was, nevertheless, to be guarded against. The dutiful 
monk would need to be mindful that his quest to achieve obedience and submission 
could pass over into a form of self-destructive hubris. Cassian recalls tales of monks 
casting themselves down wells, fasting excessively, or crossing deserts without food, in 
an effort to demonstrate just how catastrophically they had purged themselves of natural 
inclinations and desires (see Foucault 2014, 291). Despite appearances, these were not 
acts of extreme piety, but were symptomatic of an obsessive desire for glory. As Foucault 
would have it, the monasteries of the fourth century were themselves established in 
response to an Ôuntrammelled intensification of ascetic practices current at the end of the 
third and start of the fourth centuryÕ. Rather threateningly, these transformed Christian 
practices into a form of self-mastery where the ascetic would travel beyond the grasp of 
power, overcoming suffering, becoming indifferent to pain (Foucault 2014, 292). As 
such, asceticism posed a challenge to Christianity, delivering its practitioners beyond the 
influence of its institutions and teachings. The most potent ascetics effectively reversed 
the self-denials of obedience, transforming these denials into a form of Ôegoistic self-
masteryÕ that denied access to external power (Foucault 2004, 207-8). To secure their 
foothold, monastic and ecclesiastical institutions had, therefore, to purge themselves of 
all these vagrant, self-sufficient, ascetic heresies, and bring all miracles, marvels, 
punishments and self-flagellations back into the orbit of their influence. This was 
achieved in part by developing the idea that the devil present within us cannot be cast 
out alone. He may even lie behind those acts that we consider most holy. And so, 
excessive fasting, for example, could be the devilÕs work, as he seeks to weaken those 
abstaining from food from resisting other temptations. Hence, the monk must learn to 
exercise discrimination, moderating his devotional activities where necessary, and 
inspecting every inclination and thought.  
This kind of inspection, which seeks to cast out the devilÕs trickery, including 
illusions of piety implanted by the devil, can only by carried out under the auspices of an 
institutional framework where one monk is willing to rely upon the ear of another. This 
ear must not become too friendly, however. In some early monasteries young monks 
were expected Ôto maintain a distance of one cubit between each otherÕs bodiesÕ (Brown 
2008, 246). The monk to whom one confesses does not have to be an intimate, nor does 
this monk require greater powers of discrimination. The monk to whom one confesses is 
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an instrument in the moral architecture of the monastery, where the purpose of 
confession is not necessarily to appeal to anotherÕs better judgement. Indeed, the form of 
confession is more important than the wisdom of the person to whom one speaks. It is 
designed to turn the monkÕs inner world Ôinside outÕ leaving nothing within that Ôcould 
not be placed unhesitatingly before othersÕ (Brown 2008, 231). In principle, there would 
be nothing left that could be privately willed; evil forces would no longer be allowed to 
carry out their devilry under cover. 
This distinction is rather important, since it places the operation of power within 
the practice of confession itself, rather than within the authority of the person to whom 
one confesses. Foucault takes care to emphasise this point, claiming that in the early 
monastery Ôthe quality of the person to whom one speaks, the advice he might be able to 
give, and his experienceÕ are less important than Ôthe simple fact of speakingÕ. The Ômain 
component [of confession] is not the pedagogical or medical role of the master, [but] the 
fact that one utters it to someone who is basically an xÕ (Foucault 2014, 306). 
Confession expresses and brings to the surface thoughts and feelings, however 
fleeting, that the monk may otherwise have ignored or been able to forget. Their 
Ôobjective contentÕ, whether they are true or false, is less important than what they reveal 
about the preoccupations of the thinker (Foucault 2014, 302). These thoughts are to be 
sifted through since they are symptomatic of the soul which is given form and made 
available to inspection through confession. The expectation is that confession becomes 
perpetual and continuous, allowing the Ôflow of thoughts that ceaselessly agitate the 
monkÕs soulÕ to be put under constant supervision (Foucault 2014, 306). This obligation 
to confess also ties the monk to his community, forcing him to establish a connection in 
which submission is accompanied by a great deal of disclosure. The monk not only gives 
up his freedom and renounces his will, he also commits to making himself known, 
permanently and in almost every detail, so that these details can be acted upon, and 
perhaps extinguished.  
In summary, the educational good of the early monastery was tied to systems of 
denial by which members would inflict monastic discipline upon themselves as if it were 
a privilege to do so; only those who were prepared to prostate themselves before the 
gates of the community would be admitted. This good was to be forever approached, 
and never realised despite the tireless devotions of an entire community working 
according to its regimen. And if the educational good to which all aspired appeared to 
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manifest itself, either in pious individuals or in pious acts, these individuals and acts were 
to be suspected for their vainglory.   
 
 
IV. 
 
The fragments considered above explore how the educational good is translated into late 
antiquity. Versions of the educational good appear across these fragments, each version 
indebted to a more ancient metaphysic of deferral. This metaphysic is associated with the 
Greek conception of sophia Ð a wisdom which can be approached but never fully realised. 
In each fragment it becomes apparent that the educational good is not simply deferred in 
late antiquity. This postponement is connected to various techniques that ensnare those 
to be educated into desiring their subjugation to an educational promise that will remain 
forever empty. So, we have three fragments, and three systems of deferral building on 
those ancient promises of Greek philosophy, but extending into systems born of and 
reinforcing the weakness of those who educate, and those who would be educated by 
them.  
In the first fragment we have the case of the comparatively weak tutor who must 
convince his patron of his wisdom, an effort that must inevitably be at his patronÕs 
expense since the education on offer must at times reorient his soul by domesticating his 
body. In the second fragment, the educational good is tied to an attempt to convince the 
soon-to-be baptised of his or her weakness to all kinds of devilry. By implication, only a 
lifetime spent in service of an educational good of Christian extraction can save the soul 
from its fallen state. In the third fragment, we have a version of the educational good 
that scrupulously avoids locating that good in the leading figures of the institution that 
promises it, tying it instead to an endless process of introspection.  
We have, in sum, three influential models, employing techniques of seduction, 
suspicion and diversion. In the first fragment, those to be educated are seduced into 
believing in the promise of education in advance, in a way that insists they will not 
understand the value of that education on offer until they have accepted its authority. In 
the second fragment, personal suspicion is encouraged in a way that subdues those to be 
educated, convincing the baptised that only through education will their worst 
inclinations be reformed, a process requiring constant commitment, and hence entailing 
another system of deferral and denial. In the third fragment we encounter a strategy of 
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diversion, where those to be educated in a more formal institutional setting are not to 
assume that the educational good is best manifested in the highest echelons of the 
institutional hierarchy. Rather, they are drawn into a set of relations that insists they must 
refuse to believe the educational good when it appears manifested in this or that pious 
soul. The monk must constantly inspect his own motivations in seeking to attain the 
educational promise that the monastic order is built upon.  
Three systems of deferral can be found in late antiquity then, which are also 
systems of subjection. In these contexts the educational good is ever more fervently 
believed as it is cloaked, tying those who would pursue it to an education in which hope 
is forced but never realised. The implications of observations such as these for present-
day educators may not be immediately obvious. Suggested here, nevertheless, is a line of 
descent, and a scheme of analysis through which we can begin to interrogate the 
ramifications of an educational landscape, in which the hope of an educational good, yet 
to be realised, operates in such a way as to domesticate the activities of those working 
under its shadow. 
 
Notes 
[1] For a rare exception in an edited collection see the chapter by Reydams-Schils (2013) on 
Stoicism in the Roman imperial era in: Ideas of Education: Philosophy and politics from Plato to Dewey. 
 
[2] The only exception to my knowledge is the work of Nick Peim (2012; 2013). 
 
[3] This argument concerning wisdom, the attainment of which is never guaranteed but is to be 
forever worked towards by the philosopher, is linked to HadotÕs controversial but influential 
argument which holds that ancient philosophy is best understood as a series of spiritual exercises. 
Philosophy, here defined as the Ôlove of and search for wisdomÕ, entailed for each philosophical 
school a certain way of life for which wisdom was a guiding ideal (Hadot 2004: 102). In HadotÕs 
interpretation of the Symposium, for example, it is argued that Ôphilosophy is not wisdom, but a 
way of life and discourse determined by the idea of wisdomÕ (Hadot 2004: 46). Philosophy is 
Ôdefined by what it lacks Ð that is, by a transcendent norm which escapes it, yet which it 
nevertheless possesses within itself in some wayÕ (Hadot 2004: 47). This, For Hadot, is part of 
the Ôgrandeur and the paradox of ancient philosophyÕ in that it is Ôat one and the same time, 
conscious of the fact that wisdom is inaccessible, and convinced of the necessity of pursuing 
spiritual progressÕ (Hadot 1995: 265). HadotÕs case for this conception of philosophy was 
developed during the course of a long and eminent career, which is beyond the scope of this 
paper to review (see Hadot 1995; 1998; 2001; 2004). It is notable that Foucault drew attention to 
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a similar point of distinction, claiming that the ancient and contrasting figure of the sage achieves 
wisdom through inspiration rather than reason, though Ônothing obliges him to share his wisdom, 
to teach it, or demonstrate itÕ (Foucault 2011: 17). By contrast, the philosopher-teacher is always 
on the path approaching wisdom, and unlike the sage, experiences the obligation to teach, an 
office filled most famously, and most doggedly by Socrates. By contrast to the sage whose 
wisdom is distant and reserved, the philosopher-teacherÕs wisdom is applied, Ôdirected to 
individuals and situationsÕ in an attempt, however faltering, to assist the philosopherÕs 
interlocutors to live a better life (see Foucault 2005; 2011).  
It must be admitted that my point (following Hadot) regarding the nature of wisdom 
somewhat contradicts late modern attempts at a revival of Aristotelian phronesis, or practical 
wisdom (about which however Ôthere is as yet no agreed or settled viewÕ [Cooke and Carr 2014, 
92]), which hope to shore up the vulnerable professionalism of educators under attack from the 
reductive pressures of audit and instrumental rationality. Against the forces of instrumentalism, 
scholars of this revived tradition wish to demonstrate that teachers can indeed achieve practical 
wisdom, that many have already achieved it in all but name, and that this kind of wisdom, which 
must always by definition evade measurement, is the basis upon which a defence of the teaching 
profession is to be built. The problem we face, they assert, is that such practical wisdom is 
misrecognised and under-rated today. Their emphasis, then, is to demonstrate the potential and 
actual existence of practical wisdom in contemporary teaching practice. I would argue, however, 
that this strategic emphasis serves to divert contemporary scholars from giving due attention to 
that other component, or feature of wisdom, which is that wisdom in the highest sense is 
unattainable, though it can serve as an aspiration and guiding idea with very concrete effects on 
educational practice. (As an aside, it is perhaps notable that Curren [2013, 33] comes close to this 
position, though from a very different direction and with very different motives, in his critique of 
the revival of phronesis in education, where he argues that this revival has neglected the fact that in 
the Aristotelian tradition Ôthe activity of teaching is unequivocally understood to aim at 
something beyond itselfÕ.)  
 
[4] ÔIf, therefore, anyone who is either powerful or also rich wishes to become good and noble, 
he will first have to put aside his power and riches, especially in these times when he will not find 
a Diogenes who will tell the truth even to a rich man or a monarchÕ (Galen 1963, 36). 
 
[5] This point is made by Brown (2008, 235), who argues that whilst Christian ascetics may have 
given the body Ôan almost oppressive prominenceÕ as if Ômotivated by hatred of the bodyÕ, if we 
retrospectively focus only on such bodily denials we risk missing Ôits most novel and its most 
poignant aspectÕ, which was that the defiled body was also seen as the privileged training ground 
of the soul. 
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[6] According to one interpretation, the baptismal water was Ôthe water of deathÕ, the bath into 
which one was put, was ÔChristÕs tombÕ (Foucault 2014, 156). 
 
[7] It is worth noting, however that at the same time a whole succession of highly educated 
Christians, who were Ômaster practitioners in Greek and Latin styleÕ, were backing Ôinto the 
limelight that they had brought to bear on the illiterate monks, apostles, and martyrsÕ (Brown 
1992, 74). Rather paradoxically, Christianity was able to mobilise the high culture of a Roman 
elite in terms comfortable to them, whilst asserting a religion which claimed to speak to even the 
lowest members of society in their language. 
 
[8] Brown (2008, p. 257) argues that by the fifth century this radical stance had softened. The 
continence of monks was now seen as a mark of distinction, allowing them Ôto stand before the 
throne of God as the representatives of common humanityÕ. 
 
[9] The influential ÔRule of Saint BenedictÕ, a book of precepts concerning monastic life, is 
attributed to Benedict of Nursia in the sixth century, who was heavily influenced by Cassian. It 
describes a monastic order run under the auspices of an abbot, a figure who is more a 
disciplinarian overlord than he is a spiritual guide. The abbot makes sure that the Rule is 
followed, that discipline is maintained. He is not a great philosopher or theologian, who 
embodies the poise and virtue to which all aspire (see Coon, 2011). 
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